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This paper pursues two main aims. First, it distinguishes two kinds of improvisation: expert 
and inexpert. Expert improvisation is a (usually artistic) practice that the agent consciously 
sets as their goal and is evaluated according to (usually artistic) standards of improvisation. 
Inexpert improvisation, by contrast, supports and structures the agent’s action as it moves 
them towards their (usually everyday life) goals and is evaluated on its success leading the 
agent to the achievement of those goals. The second aim is to describe inexpert improvisation 
as a robustly distributed affair, one that involves the ongoing integration of embodied 
practices with social and material resources within our surrounding environments. On the 
wide approach to improvisation fostered in this paper, inexpert improvisation is claimed to be 
our default way of inhabiting our world. 
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Introduction 
 
Improvisation is sometimes assumed to be a rarefied phenomenon, a species of performative 
practice that is relatively unique insofar as it requires specialized knowledge, training, skills, 
and expertise largely confined to a particular domain.2 For example, many current discussions 
focus on skilled improvisation in the context of art (e.g., improvisational dance, theater, free-
form jazz improvisations) or athletics (e.g., a basketball player making a spontaneous behind-
the-back pass to a teammate as a defender closes in). While these discussions are useful for 
illuminating some of the experiential and behavioral dynamics distinctive of highly-skilled 
improvisational practices, they potentially lead us to adopt an excessively narrow focus that 
overlooks more common — i.e., less specialized — forms of everyday improvisation, or so 
we claim.  
 
In this chapter, we argue against a narrow approach to improvisation. We challenge this 
narrow approach in two ways. First, we develop a “wide” perspective that situates 
improvisation directly within the ebb and flow of everyday life (i.e., and not primarily unique 
or specialized domains). Second, we argue that a wide perspective highlights the extent to 
which everyday improvisation is very often a robustly distributed (i.e., beyond-the-head) 
affair, one that involves the ongoing integration of sensorimotor processes with social and 
material resources within the artifacts, practices, and institutions that make up everyday life. 
We conclude that, to fully understand the phenomenon of improvisation, we should enlarge 
the scope of analysis and shift attention from expert improvisation (which has narrow 
relevance in our daily life) to inexpert improvisation (which, by contrast, is a pervasive 
phenomenon in our lives). 
 
We develop our wide perspective in several steps. First, we start by distinguishing between 
everyday (i.e., inexpert) and expert improvisation. To begin with the latter: when an action is 
based on expert improvisation, improvisation is the goal of the action — or more precisely, 
improvisation is a proximate goal of the action, in contradistinction to the action’s distal goal 
(we come back to this distinction in the next section). Improvisation, that is, is part of the 
conditions of satisfaction of the intention that steers the action. Accordingly, to perform an 
                                                     
2 We discuss some reasons for this assumption and how it has informed treatments of improvisation within 
certain disciplinary quarters in section 2. 
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action in an expertly improvised way is one specific way of performing the action, and the 
success of the action will be assessed depending, among other things, on whether and how 
the action’s (proximate) goal (i.e., improvisation) has been achieved. In contrast, inexpert 
improvisation is not part of the intention’s conditions of satisfaction and, hence, is not a way 
of performing the action. Rather, inexpert improvisation could be seen as a set of processes 
— e.g., trial and error strategies, action monitoring and prediction, motor imagery, etc. (as we 
will see, some of which are distributed) — the outcome of which is to support and structure 
the agent’s action as it moves her towards her goal. In this case, too, the success of the action 
will be assessed depending on whether and how the goal has been achieved. However, the 
key difference between expert and inexpert improvisation is that, for the latter, improvisation 
is neither a proximate nor a distal goal of the action. 
 
In the second step, we corroborate this conceptual distinction by highlighting the extent to 
which everyday inexpert improvisation is very often a robustly distributed affair, one that 
involves the ongoing integration of embodied practices with social and material resources 
within our surrounding environments. Inexpert improvisation is, we argue, constitutive of our 
default way of inhabiting our world. This is because as embodied and situated subjects, we 
are continually adapting in real-time to the ongoing — and often unpredictable — flow of 
forces and feedback we receive from the people, things, and spaces around us. In other 
words, we are continually determining what to do now based on how the world is now— an 
improvisational dynamic at the heart of both individual and joint action. We conclude our 
discussion by briefly considering some broader implications of our wide approach to 
improvisation.  
 
 
 
1. Identifying two forms of improvisation 
 
We begin by distinguishing two forms of improvisation: inexpert improvisation and expert 
improvisation. We underpin this distinction by developing a series of considerations about 
intentional actions, intentions, and goals. This section draws a conceptual distinction which is 
then underpinned by the empirical observations made in section 2. 
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Some of our actions are intentional in the sense that they are triggered, steered, and 
monitored by intentions as a specific kind of pro-attitudes. Consider the action of your arm 
moving up and the action of you raising your arm. Although these two events, in principle, 
might be indiscernible from an external observer’s perspective, they clearly differ from each 
other. Notoriously, this observation led Wittgenstein to raise the question as to what marks 
the difference between these two actions (Wittgenstein 1958, Sect. 621). Part of the answer to 
this question, it can be contended, has to do with the fact that the second, but not the first, 
action has been caused and was controlled by an intention of the agent.  
 
Interestingly, the notion of intention comes in different forms. In this paper, we are mainly 
interested in so-called “prior intentions”, which is an expression that roughly maps onto the 
sense of the more colloquial term ‘decisions’ (see Salice 2018 in relation to the following 
description of prior intentions, which largely relies on the works of Bratman, Gilbert, and 
Searle). If understood in this sense, the intention is that mental act which brings a process of 
deliberation to an end. In deliberation, the agent is confronted with different options for their 
future conduct and, by forming the intention, the agent settles on one of those options. The 
agent thereby commits herself to that conduct. This aspect distinguishes prior intentions from 
desires, which are not infused by a commitment and therefore wax and wane in time. This 
commitment also enhances stability in the future actions of an agent insofar as it puts the 
agent under the pressure of planning their actions in such a way as to enable the satisfaction 
of the prior intention. This allows the identification of another difference between intentions 
and desires: intentions are “causally self-reflexive” attitudes in the sense that, for them to be 
satisfied, they require that the very intention plays a causal role in its satisfaction. So, for 
instance, if at the end of high school Pam ponders which career to pursue and she decides to 
become an academic, her intention will be satisfied if it is causally active in bringing about 
the state of affairs of Pam’s being an academic. By contrast, desires are not causally self-
reflexive: if your desire is to become rich, then inheriting money from a dead relative will 
satisfy your desire even though your desire played no causal role in bringing about that state 
of affairs.  
 
Prior intentions are attitudes with a world-to-mind direction of fit: they represent the world in 
a certain manner and the attitude is satisfied only if the world complies with that 
representation. When Pam has decided to become an academic, then her intention will be 
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satisfied if she manages in bringing about the state of affairs of Pam’s being an academic. 
That state of affairs, as the outcome of her action, is the condition of satisfaction of her 
intention. Sometimes, the outcome of an action (which typically does not exist at the moment 
in which the agent has made a decision) is called “the goal” in the relevant literature 
(Butterfill 2013).3 In this paper, we prefer a different terminological usage: we will call the 
“goal of an agent” the representation this agent has of the world when they form an 
intention.4 The goal that Pam’s intention specifies is the representation of the intention’s 
conditions of satisfaction: to become an academic. If the outcome of her action matches the 
way she has represented the world in her intention, then the intention is satisfied. Our 
terminological postulation nicely squares with the way in which we sometimes talk about 
goals: “satisfying”, “reaching” or “achieving one’s goal” are expressions which are at least 
compatible with our understanding of a goal. Importantly, we can distinguish between 
proximate and distal goals. Imagine Pam sets for herself the distal goal to become an 
academic. In order to achieve this (distal) goal, several other goals, i.e., proximate goals, 
must first be achieved first. For instance, Pam could decide to publish her PhD dissertation. 
This is a proximate goal, which serves the realization of her distal goal. Had Pam, by 
contrast, decided to reach her distal goal by publishing several papers (rather than a single 
book), then her proximate goal would be different from the one in the previous scenario — 
but her distal goal would remain the same.  
 
The picture that emerges is therefore one in which, by forming one’s intention, i.e., by setting 
one’s goal, the agent also indicates some criteria of evaluation of their action. One could say 
that prior intentions set certain standards for an agent’s success. If the action is such that it 
brought about an outcome which corresponds to the agent’s goal, then the action should be 
evaluated positively. By contrast, if the action is such that it did not bring about an outcome 
corresponding to the agent’s goal, then the action should be evaluated negatively. This holds 
for both proximate and distal goals. Suppose, once again, that Pam decides to have an 
academic career by publishing her PhD dissertation. Eventually, she reaches her proximate 
but not her distal goal; while she publishes her dissertation, other factors prevent her from 
becoming an academic. In this case, something has obviously gone wrong in her plan. The 
                                                     
3 According to a different terminological use, “goals” are conative states of a particular kind—different from desires and 
from intentions (Bratman 2014).  
4 We remain neutral on whether “representation” is a mental state or the content (in opposition to the object) of a mental 
state as nothing in our paper hinges on this issue.  
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same can be said if the converse happens: she becomes an academic but without publishing 
her dissertation. Even though the degree of failure is certainly milder if compared with the 
previous scenario, something has, once again, gone wrong in her original plan.  
 
At this stage, it is important to briefly touch upon an important and complex issue — one that 
will have direct bearing on the discussion below. This is the idea that the agent, when 
forming their intention, might not have complete practical knowledge on how to reach their 
goal. To go back to our example, it is highly likely that at the moment in which Pam decides 
to become an academic, she won’t have access to all of the knowledge one needs in order to 
become an academic. Of course, one could suppose that, as time passes, she will be 
accumulating knowledge of what is required of her to reach that goal (how to give a talk, how 
to write a paper, how to network with her peers etc.). For now, we do not need to further 
elaborate on the notion of practical knowledge. For this brief characterization can already put 
us in a position to identify a first sense of the term “improvisation”. Since Pam’s actions 
towards the goal are steered by insufficient practical knowledge (however this notion should 
be defined more precisely), she will improvise: we call this form of improvisation inexpert 
improvisation. 
 
Three comments are in order on inexpert improvisation. First, it is highly likely that 
improvisation in this first sense just is an umbrella notion for several different strategies the 
agent will activate to reach her goal. Trial and error, quick heuristic, imitation of others and 
their actions, etc. are all strategies that seem to fall within this broad category (some of these 
processes and strategies will be investigated in the next section). The second comment relates 
to the idea that inexpert improvisation does not apply only to diachronically extended agency 
serving significant life-decisions, as in the case of Pam’s deciding to become an academic; 
short-lived and everyday actions may be called “improvised” in the very same sense (we 
discuss many more examples of everyday improvisation below). For example, suppose that 
you decide the time has finally come to fix your clogged tap — but you have no expertise in 
this area whatsoever. In order to fix the tap, you will therefore have to improvise in the sense 
at stake: e.g., fiddle with the tap to get a sense of how it’s constructed; watch some YouTube 
videos; use duct tape or nuts and bolts to craft a makeshift wrench upon realizing you don’t 
have the appropriate tools for the job. Another way of reporting what you are doing in this 
scenario is by saying that, because you don’t know how to fix the tap, you are trying to fix 
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the tap (where the verb ‘trying’ captures the notion of inexpert improvisation at stake here). 
Finally, improvisation will be evaluated only based on instrumental values, that is, based on 
its capacity to enable the agent to reach their goal. If you end up fixing your tap, then your 
improvisation was successful (for that task at stake). Analogously, if Pam survives the hellish 
phase of an early academic career, then her improvisation was successful (for the task she has 
set for herself). What is important, however, is that improvisation is not a proximate goal 
serving the achievement of the distal goal: the agent did not decide to fix the tap by 
improvising or to achieve an academic career by improvising. To put this differently, the 
agent is thematically focused only on reaching their goal (fixing the tap), not on 
improvisation itself.  
 
These comments put us in the position to introduce the second sense of improvisation. Let us 
start with the idea that, whereas inexpert improvisation is something that the agent standardly 
is forced to adopt in order to reach a goal that she is unsure how to reach, expert 
improvisation is something that is deliberately envisioned by an agent. More precisely, 
improvisation is something that an agent can set as their goal. The agent, that is, may decide 
to perform an action which is, in its essence, improvised. Accordingly, it can be claimed that 
expert improvisation itself (in contrast to inexpert improvisation) is something the agent is 
thematically aware of. Further comments are in order. First, we conjecture that the second 
sense of improvisation is most frequently found in art practices: dance, literature, painting, 
theatre, music, etc. Second, we again conjecture that, just as for inexpert improvisation, the 
label of “expert improvisation” encompasses different phenomena and, specifically, different 
practices. Third, it seems sensible to claim that, in these practices, expert improvisation 
usually is a proximate goal which is supposed to enable achievement of a distal goal (such as 
a striking, moving, or intense performance, or triggering an aesthetic experience in the 
audience, etc).5  
 
Based on the last comment, the relation between trying to fix the tap and fixing the tap may 
appear as analogous to the relation between engaging in improvised dance and, say, 
triggering an aesthetic experience in an audience. However, one should not overlook the 
                                                     
5 We consider as an ultimately empirical question whether expert improvisation can only stand in a proximate 
position or whether it can also be put in a distal position — see below. 
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following, and essential, difference: when it comes to inexpert improvisation, we claimed 
that, it is because the agent does not know how to fix the tap that they try to do that. By 
contrast, in the case of expert improvisation, the agent does very well know how to deliver a 
striking performance and this precisely is by way of (expertly) improvising. In this form of 
improvisation, that is, the agent is not trying to deliver a striking performance, at least not in 
the same sense in which, you can only try to reach a goal, if you don’t know how to reach it. 
  
Now, we have seen that inexpert improvisation is evaluated based on its effectiveness in 
reaching the agent’s goal. How, then, should expert improvisation be evaluated? Since expert 
improvisation is something that the agent sets as a goal for herself (regardless of whether this 
is a proximate or a distal goal), it cannot be evaluated in the same way in which inexpert 
improvisation is evaluated. Remember: inexpert improvisation, it has been claimed, is never a 
goal in itself. The value of inexpert improvisation, as it were, is entirely instrumental and 
extrinsic. We engage in inexpert improvisation only to reach a (proximate or distal) goal. 
 
By contrast, expert improvisation has intrinsic value. This is certainly the case when expert 
improvisation is the distal goal of an action (we come back to this possibility at the end of 
this section). But even when inexpert improvisation is a proximate goal in the service of a 
distal goal, then its instrumental value relies on its intrinsic value. The artist will not deliver a 
striking, moving, or intense performance and/or s/he will not trigger an aesthetic experience 
in the audience, unless improvisation carries intrinsic values (these are values that cannot be 
defined solely in virtue of their instrumental role in reaching another goal).  
 
What are the intrinsic values that characterise expert improvisation? We suggest that these 
must be defined in relation to the standards of the relevant art practice. An episode of 
improvised ballet, for instance, would have to be evaluated with reference to the aesthetic 
criteria defined within that form of art. Equally, a session of improvised jazz would have to 
be evaluated in relation to the criteria endorsed by that form of art. Accordingly, qualities that 
specify one form of improvisation as being successful in a particular domain may not apply 
to another. For example, qualities that specify successful free jazz (e.g., disregarding fixed 
instrumental roles; dissonance; rejection of fixed harmonic, rhythmic, or melodic structures, 
etc.) may not work in the context of improvised ballet, where standards of successful 
improvisation are differently constrained. Whether or not expert improvisation reaches 
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excellence entirely depends on the conditions of excellence recognised and acknowledged 
within the relevant discipline. This indicates that the two forms of improvisation we have 
distinguished — inexpert vs. expert — are genuinely distinct and that, therefore, they should 
be clearly set apart by any investigation into improvisation.  
 
Let us conclude this section by highlighting that, of course, there may be occasions where 
expert and inexpert improvisation may overlap. Let us return to Pam the academic. Imagine 
that Pam is, for the first time in her life, invited to engage in an improvised dance session. As 
this is the first time to be confronted with this task, Pam is understandably nervous, but she 
agrees. Once she accepts the invitation, Pam sets as her goal the realisation of an episode of 
improvised dance. Note that, in this case, one could contend, improvisation is not in a 
proximate but in a distal position: Pam has not decided to engage in improvisation to reach 
other artistic goals, but she made that decision just for the sake of exploring that particular 
practice. Now, she has made that decision even though she has no clue how to improvise 
precisely because it is the first time she has tried it. This lack of knowledge is why she will 
inexpertly improvise in the pursuit of her goal (which is the improvisation itself).6 Obviously, 
this should not be taken as an indication that the forms of improvisation coincide, but rather 
that they should be disentangled if one is to give an adequate description of these kinds of 
situations. 
 
Let us take stock. In this section, we have established a conceptual distinction between 
inexpert and expert improvisation. This provides the basis for our discussion in the remainder 
of this paper. In the next sections, we will argue that inexpert improvisation is a crucial 
resource in our daily life, which ought to be appreciated in itself. In appreciating this form of 
improvisation in itself, i.e., in pointing to some of its main features and characteristics, we 
will also resist the attempt to restrict the notion of improvisation to expert improvisation tout 
court as well as the attempt to understand the notion of inexpert improvisation in the light of 
expert improvisation. 
 
2. Improvisation in everyday life and beyond the head 
 
                                                     
6 A vivid illustration of this possibility has been offered to the authors during several workshops of the Improv networking 
project (2016-18): during these workshops, professional artists have invited participants to engage in various forms of expert 
improvisation. The result consisted in several laymen improvising how to expertly improvise.  
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This section reviews some current work on improvisation to object against the narrow focus 
that has been usually put on expert improvisation. In doing so, we also provide some 
examples and empirical evidence to support our conceptual distinction. 
 
It is, perhaps, initially tempting to characterize improvisation as a relatively rare class of 
actions somehow set apart from the ebb and flow of everyday life. As the British composer 
and writer Neil Sorrell (1992) observes, part of this assumption comes from how the term is 
used in everyday parlance: “The word itself poses all kinds of problems, not only because of 
its extensive and vague application to music, but also because of its usage in everyday 
speech, conveying something that is insufficiently prepared and of no lasting value (for 
example, “an improvised shelter”) (p. 776). Call this the “uniqueness assumption” (UA). UA 
is the idea that improvisation is a temporary and novel form of action distinct from the 
“normal” (i.e., non-improvised) modes of action that characterize most of our everyday 
skilled behavior.  
  
UA can be found, for example, within the discourses and techniques that frame how 
improvisation is theorized and taught within many musical communities in Western 
pedagogical culture (Torrance & Schumann, 2019; van der Schyff, 2017). Within these 
communities, improvisation is thought of as a mode of performance that deviates from 
normal recitative performance. Musicians are taught to master the skills needed to correctly 
read and play from notated works of distinguished composers. So, although improvisation 
was a common feature of European art music well into the nineteenth century, “[t]he current 
musical culture in Western countries — one in which a highly skilled instrumentalist may be 
completely incapable of improvising — is historically and culturally unique. Today, in 
Western cultures, improvisation is almost entirely absent from the high art tradition and, 
consequently, is almost completely absent from the music education curriculum” (Sawyer, 
2007, p. 1). In light of these assumptions, it is therefore not surprising that musicians who’ve 
received this classical scripted training often find it challenging to deviate from the printed 
manuscript when they are invited to experiment and improvise (Torrance & Schumann, 2019, 
p. 259).7 
                                                     
7 See Shiavio and Hoffding (2019) for an extended treatment of musicking, across a range of different domains, 
that portrays musicking as fundamentally a creative and improvisatory exploration of both music and the bodily 
and social self.  
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In addition to UA, there is a second assumption found in the improvisation literature also 
relevant to our concerns here. It is that improvisation is largely a head-bound affair insofar as 
it requires specialized knowledge, skills, and training that are unique to, and realized within, 
the head of the individual. Call this the “head-bound assumption” (HBA). HBA is motivated 
by a tendency (which, as we’ll see, is not entirely unfounded) to see improvisation as a form 
of creativity requiring the possession of different forms of knowledge. Accordingly, as 
Linson and Clarke observe, “[i]ntuition might suggest that creativity and cognition must 
originate in the mind of an individual (after all, our thoughts, insights and new discoveries 
seem to occur in our own heads)” (Linson & Clarke, 2017, p. 54). We find HBA made 
explicit in the work of some anthropologists and psychologists. They portray the knowledge 
and skills needed for creativity and improvisation as emerging from prototypical schemas or 
“memes” — information-bearing modules that have been copied into an individual’s head by 
prior processes of replication (Aunger, 2000; Sperber, 1996). As Ingold and Hallam (2007) 
observe, for this meme-theory approach, these modules “are supposed to inhabit the mind as 
genes inhabit the body, whenever they control that carrier’s thought and behaviour” (p.6). To 
understand the origin and character of improvisation, therefore, primarily requires focusing 
on things going on inside the head of the individual.    
 
The wide perspective we advocate here challenges both UA and HBA and argues for a 
different way of thinking about improvisation and its place in our lives. From this 
perspective, improvisation is an essential part of our day-to-day activities — no matter how 
mundane or familiar. In fact, a closer look suggests that we improvise more often than we 
follow a fixed script; the latter is the rarer class of action than the former. Improvisation is 
therefore arguably our default way of being-in-the-world, a central feature of both individual 
and collective action. To use our terminology, most of our everyday actions consist (at least 
partially) of inexpert improvisation. This is because the goal of our everyday improvisation is 
generally not the improvisation itself; our acts of improvisation serve, rather, as a means 
toward some further end, a way of coping with an unpredictable and continually changing 
world. They consist of a suite of strategies, enacted over both short and long-term timescales, 
that we use to reach our goal: again, things like trial and error, quick heuristic, imitation of 
others and their actions, etc. And as we’ll see, these strategies are often dynamically driven 
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and regulated, in an ongoing way, by norm-governed artifacts and institutions that lie beyond 
individual heads.  
   
2.1 Improvisation in everyday life 
 
To make these points clearer, let us first consider how central improvisation is to some 
common everyday activities. Writing things on paper, for example, might initially seem to be 
a relatively straightforward activity that leaves little room for improvisation. When writing, 
we generally know what we want to say and how we want to say it. And we do so by drawing 
upon skills that have been trained over many years to render the “correct” form of the 
numbers and letters we write. However, as Ingold and Hallam (2007) observe, “there is no 
script for script” (p.13). The activity of writing involves making fine adjustments in response 
to monitoring the conditions of the task as it unfolds: the feel of the pen, the flow of the ink, 
the resistance of the paper, developing muscle cramps, changes in the ambient lightning, etc. 
Moreover, even when working within the formal constraints of writing, rendering a line on 
the paper is an ongoing act of gestural improvisation (ibid., p.13); an individual’s 
handwriting is, perhaps, as distinctive as their voice. This is because writing is more than 
simply a means of communication. It is “oneself on paper” (Sassoon, 2000, p. 103) — a 
creative act of self-expression that emerges through many years of experimentation and 
improvisation. 
 
Next, consider another straightforward example: going for a walk to get some fresh air. 
Taking a walk can be a relatively long process depending upon one’s intentions and stamina. 
But it also consists of ongoing acts of moment-to-moment “micro-improvisations”, as we 
might term them. When we first set out, we may not initially know where we’re going but 
instead simply arbitrarily start walking in one direction instead of the other as we reach the 
end of our driveway; we might amble slowly before later picking up the pace as our muscles 
start to warm up; bored of this side of the road, we cross to the other for a better view; we 
step nimbly over cracks; suddenly duck down a side road to avoid a chatty neighbor; pause to 
gaze with admiration at a well-manicured garden; catch our balance after stumbling over an 
uneven portion of the sidewalk, etc.  
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Opportunities for improvisation frequently arise in everyday life because things often go 
wrong or arise unexpectedly. Responding to the unexpected and recalibrating our actions and 
expectations accordingly is, as Dewey observes, the basis of learning — a perpetual 
movement from disequilibrium (confusion, doubt, uncertainty) toward equilibrium 
(satisfaction, knowledge)  (Dewey, 1934/1980). Imagine you step awkwardly during your 
neighborhood walk and badly sprain your ankle. Suddenly, much has changed — beyond the 
obvious fact of your physical injury. Your relationship to the environment as a whole has 
been thrust into a state of disequilibrium. This is because you can no longer rely upon the 
skills, habits, and powers that were previously taken for granted (e.g., the ability to move 
freely and without pain). A quiet tree-lined street that previously afforded pleasant walking is 
now experienced as a foreboding environment. So, you must improvise. You might hobble up 
to a nearby doorstep and ask for assistance; call for help using your mobile phone; lean on the 
bumper of a nearby car for some temporary relief as you plot your next move; signal to 
construction workers across the street that you need help; use a nearby fallen tree branch as a 
make-shift cane, etc.  
 
The point of these considerations is that our everyday skills and actions are, to use another of 
Dewey’s favored terms, remarkably plastic. When you sprain your ankle, you are forced to 
suddenly recalibrate how you relate to the environment as a whole and adapt in real-time to a 
new set of possibilities and constraints. This sort of improvisation does not require 
completely abandoning old skills, habits, and norms of walking, of course. But it does 
involve transforming these familiar skills and habits and, in so doing, establishing new norms 
of successful movement that reflect new ways of improvising and establishing equilibrium 
with the environment in light of your injury. These acts of improvisation are examples of 
inexpert improvisation, to use our terminology, because the goal is not the improvisation 
itself; it is, rather, a means to an end (e.g., getting home to take care of your ankle). 
Moreover, unless you have medical training or are very familiar with that environment, you 
may not know, initially, what the best course of action is or what sort of resources are 
available to you; as the shock wears off and you begin to survey your environment, your 
actions are steered by insufficient practical knowledge. Again, you must improvise. In 
addition, improvisation is evaluated solely based on whether it was conducive to the 
achievement of the goal (it was not evaluated in itself). And crucially for our purposes, the 
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form your improvised actions take is specified not only by features of your physical condition 
(i.e., your sprained ankle) but also by resources present in the environment. 
 
Despite the prominence of UA in some current debates, pragmatists and phenomenologists 
like Dewey and Merleau-Ponty were deeply attuned both to the centrality of (inexpert) 
improvisation in everyday action, as well as to the interrelation between the structure of our 
improvised actions and the norm-governed environments to which they are responsive. In 
Democracy and Education, for example, Dewey tells us that “the environment consists of 
those conditions that promote or hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic activities of a 
living being” (Dewey, 2008, p. 15). Moreover, his concept of “plasticity” — the adaptive 
quality by which individuals “learn to learn” (ibid., p. 50) — captures the extent to which our 
ability to maintain an equilibrium with our environments rests upon our capacities for open-
ended creativity and improvisation in response to the flow of changes and unexpected 
developments that are part of everyday life. 
 
Likewise, Merleau-Ponty provides an example in The Structure of Behavior that illustrates 
how a living thing’s capacity for inexpert improvisation — as well as the norms governing 
the success or failure of these improvisations — is tied to environmental features. He writes: 
 
It has long been known that the dung beetle, after the amputation of one or several 
phalanges, is capable of continuing its walk immediately. But the movements of 
the stump which remains and those of the whole body are not the simple 
perseveration of those of normal walking; they represent a new mode of 
locomotion. . . Moreover, this reorganization of the functioning of an organ 
(Umstellung) is not produced unless it is rendered necessary by the nature of the 
dynamic equilibrium between self and environment surface: on a rough surface 
where the member, even though shortened, can find points of application, the 
normal process of walking is conserved; it is abandoned when the animal comes 
upon a smooth surface (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, pp. 39–40). 
  
Again, the important point, as Laura Mcmahon observes, is that “[i]n “finding its legs” again 
after a bodily trauma, the dung beetle does not return to a past norm of walking but 
establishes a new equilibrium with its environment, when, and only when, the environmental 
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circumstance calls for it” (McMahon, 2018, p. 615). Like the sprained ankle example above, 
the insect amputee improvises in relation to its own (altered) capacity for walking and 
continually changing environmental conditions (rough vs. smooth surface). We will say more 
about the deep interdependence between inexpert improvisation and environmental resources 
in the following section.  
 
To further drive home the idea that inexpert improvisation is central to everyday life, 
consider how even the performance of relatively scripted activities is sustained by how we 
make use of spaces for improvisation that exist within these scripted activities. While 
following a recipe, for example, we may spontaneously decide to add a little extra spice 
because it simply feels right, or improvise a substitute when we realize we’re out of a 
necessary ingredient; we might suddenly feign laughter at a stranger’s awkward joke while 
making small talk at a party; consoling a distraught friend involves calibrating our responses 
in real-time to what they express and what sort of responses we think will best help them feel 
better; while standing in a queue, we may stubbornly refuse to move forward until the person 
behind us backs up and stops crowding our personal space; helping a friend move heavy 
furniture down a staircase is an ongoing delicate improvisation in response to our friend’s 
movements and the physical limitations of that space. In these cases, we may have reasonably 
well-formed goals in mind (e.g., cooking a nice dinner; making sure our conversation partner 
thinks we appreciate their humor; helping our friend work through their sadness; sending a 
social signal indicating our annoyance at being crowded; getting the furniture where it needs 
to go). But we may not always know how best to reach these goals given the contingencies of 
our current situation and/or our lack of relevant practical knowledge. So, we experiment with 
different strategies along the way until we hit upon those that, given the constraints of our 
current situation, seem most likely to work.   
 
As we’ll soon see, all of the actions mentioned above — including how and where one strolls 
through the neighborhood for some fresh air (e.g., I don’t wander through my neighbors’ 
backyards uninvited) — involve following often-complex sets of social scripts and well-
established, norm-governed conventions. However, to understand the ontology of these 
actions, we need to discuss more than just predefined scripts and conventions. This is 
because, more fundamentally, these actions arise from a real-time responsiveness to physical 
and social environments that are constantly changing — an improvisational plasticity that is 
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both responsive to environmental constraints and which also opens up new possibilities for 
further action as we adapt to and exploit these constraints (Sutton & Bicknell, Forthcoming). 
And the key takeaway point, then, is that “[b]efore and beneath any activity of plan-
following, life is a continual improvisation, a matter of deciding what to do now based on 
how the world is now” (Agre & Chapman, 1987, p. 268). Responsivity to this ongoing flow 
of nows, we suggest, is at the heart of our everyday inexpert improvisation.  
 
2.2 Improvisation beyond the head 
 
As part of our wide perspective on improvisation, we have so far challenged UA and argued 
that improvisation is not a special class of actions but rather something that is situated within 
the ebb and flow of everyday life. Inexpert improvisation — plasticity — is arguably our 
default way of being-in-the-world. Now, we want to push this wide perspective even further 
by challenging HBA. We argue that a wide perspective highlights the extent to which 
everyday improvisation is very often a robustly distributed (i.e., beyond-the-head) affair, one 
that involves the ongoing integration of sensorimotor processes with environmental artifacts 
and institutions that we interact with on a day-to-day basis. 
  
Most activities of everyday life are regulated by norm-governed practices and institutions that 
shape the structure and character of these actions. Shaun Gallagher (2013) terms these 
institutions “mental institutions”. Mental institutions are networks of social practices, rituals, 
institutions, and norm-governed artifacts that give us access to novel abilities or features of 
the world that might otherwise remain beyond our reach. For Gallagher, mental institutions 
are significant because they both augment our cognitive capacities as well as present top-
down constraints on our embodied “habits of mind” — our characteristic ways of attending 
to, interpreting, and engaging with the world — that shape our everyday acts of inexpert 
improvisation. Mental institutions have two core features: (1) they consist of cognitive 
artifacts and practices produced in specific times and places, and (2) they are activated in 
ways that extend our cognitive processes when we engage with them in the right sort of way 
(Gallagher, 2013, p. 6). These institutions come in many forms: from academic, scientific, 
legal, and religious institutions to broader cultural and economic practices. Gallagher’s focus 
is on the way that mental institutions extend cognition insofar as they open up otherwise 
inaccessible cognitive processes.  
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For example, Gallagher argues that some legal judgments — like evaluating the legitimacy of 
a specific claim — are only possible when individuals link up with artifacts and practices that 
make up the mental institution of law. This institution furnishes a rich array of beyond-the-
head resources — contracts, systems of rights and laws, norm-governed procedures, 
precedence, etc. — that enable users to manipulate and work through vast amounts of 
information they couldn’t otherwise process without this external cognitive support. 
Gallagher concludes that if we argue that cognition supervenes on individual artifacts like 
notebooks, maps, smartphones and microscopes (as extended mind theorists do), we ought to 
similarly grant cognitive status to beyond-the-head mental institutions designed specifically 
to augment our cognitive practices (Gallagher, 2013, p. 7).         
 
Gallagher focuses on large-scale mental institutions like legal systems and academic research 
practices. But our lifeworlds are full of mental institutions that work at a more local level, 
too, local institutions regulate the dynamics of how we engage with others in a shared world. 
As we’ll see, they also create spaces for everyday inexpert improvisation. For example, 
commuter trains, grocery stores, and cocktail parties are all examples of norm-governed 
institutions that regulate our behavior and social interactions. Of course, when we inhabit 
these institutions, we do not blindly follow rigid social scripts; there is, as we’ll see, ample 
room for improvisation. But the key point is this: much of the practical knowledge we have 
of these institutions and how to negotiate them is carried not just by brain-based processes or 
internal “mentalizing” that allow us to attribute mental states to others. It is also carried by 
beyond-the-head artifacts and practices designed specifically to make us intelligible to one 
another as social agents (Zawidzki, 2013). These shared artifacts and practices, and the 
mental institutions they are part of, provide a unifying context that drives and regulates our 
moment-to-moment actions while also providing creative spaces for (inexpert) improvisation 
and expressive flexibility. 
 
Some examples will help clarify this point. Consider how deeply our thought, feeling, and 
behavior are directly modulated by the artifacts, relationships, and norms — the local mental 
institutions — distinctive of the specific contexts we move through on a day-to-day basis. 
Our habits of mind are shaped by both internal and external constraints (Higgins, 2017). For 
example, without explicitly thinking about it, we seamlessly adopt different styles of 
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speaking, gesturing, behaving, and expressing emotions as we move through different 
interpersonal contexts. If we’re out for an evening of drinking and dining with friends, 
extravagant expressions of humor (e.g., big open-mouthed smiles; dramatic gestures; loud 
laughter, joking, etc.) are welcome within that mental institution and will enhance the 
atmosphere. However, these same embodied expressions will be perceived as disruptive in 
more formal contexts such as a professional meeting, a funeral, or place of worship. For the 
most part, we unreflectively adjust our bodily-expressive style to match the different 
environments and institutions we negotiate. 
  
In a similar way, evaluative appraisals of salience are modulated by our interpersonal 
contexts and the institutions that organize these contexts. We attend to and interpret the world 
differently when out for a casual night with friends than we do when participating in a 
sporting event or political rally, or when trying to find our way around a new city for the first 
time. For example, one might notice and be more inclined to act on a dirty look from a 
stranger — or respond positively to a flirty glance — when buttressed by the encouragement 
of rowdy friends than when walking the streets alone; when touring the city with a friend 
who’s an architectural historian, we will notice specific features of familiar buildings and 
built spaces in a way we won’t without their presence; we perceive a lone figure approaching 
us while walking down a deserted street at night as more threatening than when passing the 
same figure in an empty office corridor during the day.  
 
As these examples show, contextual differences in habits of mind are heavily modulated not 
just by internal but also environmental  constraints: background forces, artifacts, norms, and 
expectations — features of mental institutions — that shape the dynamics of our bodily 
responses and patterns of appraisal and behavior as we negotiate these different 
environments. The fact that we are deeply vulnerable to manipulation by ecological 
constraints, often with our full awareness or consent, reinforces how deeply this process 
occurs. For example, unspoken gender norms that structure many everyday mental 
institutions nudge women to both expect and accept more frequent interruptions than their 
male counterparts (Hancock & Rubin, 2015).8 
                                                     
8 See Slaby (2016) and Maiese and Hannah (2019) for further treatments of how we are deeply vulnerable to 
ecological manipulation by institutions such as workplace cultures and neoliberal social, educational, and 
economic institutions, respectively. For a related discussion of how mental institutions may overlook or exclude 
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For our purposes, the key point is that mental institutions are beyond-the-head resources that 
do social-cognitive work for us by guiding our context-appropriate behavior and rendering us 
intelligible to one another as social agents (Krueger, 2011, 2013). Crucially, we generally 
don’t have to plan, puzzle over, or explicitly think about what we or others are doing in a 
specific context because many aspects of social understanding and behavior are carried by the 
institutions that organize these contexts. They are scaffolded by the norms and routines that 
regulate our embodied interactions and habits of mind, and which have their social 
significance built into them (McGeer, 2001).9  
 
This scaffolding occurs on multiple timescales. On a synchronic basis, mental institutions 
provide the regulatory tracks upon which token episodes of behavior run and develop their 
normative character. Think of the local mental institutions governing actions that are part of 
playing games; lining up in the queue to board a train or plane; putting our menu on the table 
to indicate our readiness to order; taking a phone call in the quiet vestibule of the train to 
avoid irritating our fellow travellers; pausing in the conversation to let the other person finish 
their thought. For most individuals acting within these institutions, behavior that dramatically 
departs from context-specific normative expectations — e.g., talking loudly in a quiet area of 
the train, or taking a sip of water from a neighbor’s water bottle — isn’t a live option (van 
Dijk & Rietveld, 2017). Mental institutions constrain the normative range of synchronic 
action-possibilities. However, ongoing interactions with mental institutions also shape the 
diachronic development of bodily practices and habits of mind that are responsive to these 
mental institutions. These habits become sedimented into our characteristic ways of engaging 
with the world. As Roeprstorff et al (2010) note, “certain models of expectancy come to be 
established, and the patterns, which over time emerge from these practices, guide perception 
as well as action” on both short- and long-term timescales (p., 1056).     
 
So, how does all this relate to improvisation? For our purposes, two points are salient. First, 
as we’ve noted, much of the practical knowledge we use to negotiate the social world — and 
crucially, that we use to improvise — is not something we must carry around with us inside 
                                                     
individuals who don’t fit certain normative expectations (e.g., people with autism), see Krueger (forthcoming)  
and Krueger and Maiese (2018). 
9 However, as we discuss below, this environmental regulation does not preclude possibilities for improvisation 
but instead creates space for it. 
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our heads from one moment to the next. Again, it is housed in the world, at least partially 
realized within the norms, routines, artifacts, and patterned practices that make up the mental 
institutions of everyday life. When we walk into a new situation — imagine we’ve just 
started a new job and we’re invited to a colleague’s party — we need not expend significant 
cognitive energy trying to sort out what to do or how to do it. Instead, we offload part of that 
cognitive work onto the world (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). The local mental institutions 
governing parties provide regulatory resources that provide this information for us. More 
formally, the artifacts and practices that make up our mental institutions both locally and 
globally convert computationally demanding folk-psychological tasks (e.g., making 
inferences about others’ mental states, appropriate party conduct, etc.) into easier perceptuo-
motor tasks (jointly coordinating our behavior to shared rules of party-going, small talk, 
drinking, dancing, etc.) and, in so doing, reduces the descriptive complexity of that 
environment by guiding our attention to salient features of relevant norm-governed behavior. 
This mental institution in this way scaffolds our selective attention and guides our context-
appropriate actions. It helps us skillfully negotiate this context without our having to 
internalize all the relevant practical information. 
 
Second, while these institutions regulate our attention, behavior, and habits of mind, they 
don’t strip us of all of our agency and autonomy.10 The fact that they do some of the social-
cognitive work for us means that they also nevertheless create spaces for improvisation, 
creativity, and unique forms of self-expression. In other words, while mental institutions 
often scaffold our practical knowledge by telling us what to do and when and how to do it, 
we also find creative ways to improvise within these institutions. We do so because we don’t 
have to overthink about what to do or when or how to do it; again, we let the institutions do 
much of this work for us. And this offloading, in turn, frees up creative resources for 
improvisation as we are synchronically and diachronically guided by the behavioral and 
attentional constraints set up by these institutions. Mental institutions may therefore provide a 
fixed set of environmental cues, prompts, practices, and artefactual resources that fill in the 
gaps in our practical knowledge. But as inexpert improvisers (in our sense of the term), we 
are nevertheless still free to improvise in terms of how and when we choose to exploit these 
resources — that is, how, exactly, we choose to use them in order to reach our goal. We 
                                                     
10 Although their impact runs deep. See Maiese and Hanna (2019) for an extended critique of neoliberal mental 
institutions. 
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remain attuned to these resources while using them to creatively attend, anticipate, and act in 
context-appropriate ways as situations dynamically shift and change (Sutton & Bicknell, 
Forthcoming).     
 
 
 
3. Final thoughts 
 
In this chapter, we have argued against a narrow approach to improvisation, one that rests 
upon what we’ve termed the “uniqueness assumption” (UA) and “head-bound assumption” 
(HBA), respectively. We began by distinguishing two forms of improvisation: inexpert 
improvisation and expert improvisation. We explored this distinction by developing a series 
of considerations about intentional actions, intentions, and goals. We then turned to some 
empirical observations to further develop this distinction. We challenged a narrow approach 
to improvisation (and the two assumptions informing it) in two ways: first, we developed a 
“wide” alternative by showing how creativity and improvisation are not confined to unique or 
specialized domains but are instead central features of everyday life. Second, we argued that 
a wide perspective shows how everyday inexpert improvisation is very often a robustly 
distributed (i.e., beyond-the-head) affair, one that involves the ongoing integration of 
individuals with the various mental institutions — rich networks of norm-governed artifacts, 
rituals, practices, and institutions — that structure everyday life and forms of interpersonal 
relatedness. These mental institutions provide a unifying context regulating our moment-to-
moment interactions while also providing creative spaces for inexpert improvisation and 
expressive flexibility. Based upon these considerations, we concluded that a comprehensive 
investigation of the phenomenon of improvisation should broaden its scope to include not 
only expert improvisation — which, while interesting, has limited relevance to everyday 
experience — and take a more focused look at inexpert improvisation, which is foundational 
to our social and cultural life. 
 
So, where does this leave us? A key takeaway lesson from these “wide” considerations is that 
improvisation is, to use Ingold and Hallam’s (2007) helpful phrase, “the way we work”. If, as 
we’ve argued, improvisation is fundamental to everyday life, it seems “not just that life is 
unscripted, but more fundamentally, that it is unscriptable. Or, to put it another way, it cannot 
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be fully codified as the output of any system of rules and representations” (p.12). To get 
through life the way that we do, we must remain open and responsive to continually changing 
environmental constraints. And this requires ongoing improvisation. However, as our 
discussion of mental institutions indicated, we set up our environments (and the resources 
within them) in ways that both animate and support this process across multiple timescales. 
These environments do not spring up fully formed. Instead, they develop over time as our 
social and cultural practices evolve and take shape. A properly “wide” perspective on 
improvisation would therefore account for these creative dynamics at the cultural level. In 
other words, it would investigate how our everyday practices of improvisation are produced, 
reproduced, refined, and reconfigured over many generations as individuals arise within 
environments set up to support the development of their improvisatory skills. But that is a 
project for another time. 
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